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Abstract
This paper examines the pricing of public debt in a quantitative macroeconomic model
with government default risk. Default may occur due to a scal policy that does not
preclude a Ponzi game. When a build-up of public debt makes this outcome inevitable,
households stop lending such that the government has to default. Interest rates on gov-
ernment bonds reect expectations of this event. There may exist multiple bond prices
compatible with a rational expectations equilibrium. We analyze the conditions under
which expected default risk premia can quantitatively rationalize sizeable spreads on pub-
lic bonds. Sovereign default risk premia turn out to emerge at either very high debt to
output ratios, or if the variance of productivity shocks is large.
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1 Introduction
Recent scal policy measures that aim to reduce the macroeconomic impact of the nancial
crisis have boosted public decits in almost all industrialized countries. According to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2009) gross public debt in the G20 countries will surge
to 106% of GDP by 2010. As a consequence, concerns about future government default
on debt obligations have become a topic widely discussed in the nancial press, as well
as the possibility of interest rates on government bonds rising as a reection of default
risk. Indeed, sizeable yield spreads between government bonds of member countries of the
European Monetary Union have been observed over the course of recent years, even before
the current crisis.
For example, in mid 2007 the interest rates on one year government obligations in
the highly indebted countries Belgium and Greece (who had debt to gdp ratios of 88.7
and 96.5 percent) were 23.7 and 113.9 basis points, respectively, above the interest rates
on comparable German government bonds.2 For longer term government securities of
Eurozone members, there is a well documented empirical pattern showing that interest
rate spreads exist and are increasing in the level of a countrys indebtedness (see e.g.
Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009). Since, within a currency union, government bonds of
all member countries are subject to the same amount of ination risk and there is no
di¤erential exchange rate risk, this divergence in interest rates could be interpreted as
reecting the risk of governments defaulting on their debt obligations. One obvious policy
concern would be that higher interest rates on sovereign debt instruments due to default
risk premia additionally worsen the scal position of indebted governments.
The present paper analyzes government default risk and its reection in public bond in-
terest rates within a quantitative macroeconomic model, where default is modelled similar
to Uribes (2006) "Fiscal Theory of Sovereign Default". The question is whether sizeable
risk premia on short-term debt amounting from several tens to over a hundred basis points
can be rationalized when interest rates are equilibrium outcomes reecting the principles
of consumption based asset pricing. While the empirical literature has documented the
existence of spreads that may be interpreted as risk premia (see e.g. Codogno et al., 2003,
Bernoth et al., 2006, Akitobi and Stratmann, 2008), it is presently unclear in how far the
emergence of sovereign default risk premia for countries without recent default experiences
can be explained within a dynamic general equilibrium framework that is the standard
workhorse of contemporary macroeconomics. The present paper addresses this question.
There is, of course, a large theoretical literature on sovereign default that focuses on
2Data refer to yields of newly issued one year central government securities and were collected from the
countriesrespective Treasury internet sites; data on debt to gdp ratios is from Eurostat.
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external debt in open economies. In this literature, default is modelled as a deliberate
strategic decision of the government that reects the outcome of an optimization problem
(see Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981, or Arellano, 2008, among others). While this assumption
is certainly useful for the case where it has been applied to in the literature, namely
external debt of emerging market economies, we view it as less suited to explain risk
premia in developed economies where governments have not been observed defaulting on
their debt in the recent past. Since sovereign default has not occurred in, for example,
member countries of the European Union in the postwar period, yet public bonds issued
by these countriesgovernments are priced di¤erently from each other, we decide not to
model default as a purposefully chosen action of the government.3 Instead, our approach
is complementary to the existing literature in that we analyze default risk based on a non-
optimizing government issuing short-term debt while facing a maximum debt repayment
capacity. In our framework, the government honors its debt obligations as far as possible,
but default inevitably occurs if lenders stop rolling over public debt, which will be the
case when the government becomes unable to avoid a Ponzi game (even for the maximum
present value of future government surpluses). As a consequence, while government default
may occur in equilibrium, it is a rare event in our model. We use this setup to infer the
pricing of default risk.
Specically, we study a stylized closed economy that is subject to serially correlated
shocks to labor productivity. The government levies a proportional tax on labor income
(there are no lump-sum taxes available) and issues non-state contingent one-period debt
contracts in order to nance a given stream of real government expenditures. According
to these contracts, the government repays debt with a predetermined real interest rate. In
case of default, lenders can just seize current net revenues from the government, a situation
that di¤ers from private credit relations where the lender may become a claimant on future
prot streams. The only risk associated with bond investments is default risk, since we
assume that bonds are real so that debt revaluations via price level shifts (which are the
focus in the scal theory of the price level, see Woodford, 1994, Sims, 1994, or Niepelt,
2004) are impossible.
This is one aspect that distinguishes our approach to sovereign default from the oth-
erwise closely related work by Uribe (2006), who considers nominal debt and exogenous
surpluses in an endowment economy to demonstrate that default is inevitable under cer-
tain monetary-scal policy regimes. Most relevant to our context is Uribes (2006) scenario
3Our approach can further be motivated by the empiricial evidence in Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2008), who
nd that in surprisingly many cases default does not involve external debt. Therefore, the open economy
focus of the previous literature may not capture important aspects, a gap that we attempt to ll by our
model of internal government default.
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under price level targeting, where he determines default rates by applying simple scal
closing rules (e.g. to default if the current tax-to-debt ratio exceeds some positive con-
stant). In this paper, we instead introduce the assumption that investors stop lending in
the case where a government Ponzi-game becomes inevitable, which allows us to determine
an entire sequence of default rates.4 By considering productivity shocks, which give rise to
endogenous primary surpluses and stochastic discount factors, we quantitatively assess the
determination and the magnitude of default risk premia using consumption based bond
prices.
The central assumption is that the government sets taxes in a way that does not rule out
Ponzi schemes. If adverse productivity shocks make the present value of future surpluses
fall short of covering the level of outstanding debt even with the revenue maximizing tax
rate which is well dened here, because with only labor income taxation there is a tax
La¤er curve with an interior maximum , applied for the entire future, the governments
maximum debt repayment capacity is exceeded. A potential household-lender who realizes
that he would support a Ponzi game if he invested in government bonds will stop lending
to the government. In this case, default becomes inevitable and current surpluses are
distributed to bond holders, who therefore experience only a partial redemption of their
investments. Each individual lender will assess the probability that this event will occur in
the next period and will consequently demand a default risk premium as a compensation
for expected losses.
We use the model to assess the inuence of the level of government debt in relation
to output and of changes in labor productivity on risk premia. The main results are as
follows.
First, there are either no or multiple equilibrium prices for government debt. In partic-
ular, two interest rates on government bonds can exist in equilibrium: both a combination
of high interest rates, high default risk, and high public debt, as well as one of low in-
terest rates, low default risk, and low public debt can be compatible with the expected
rate of return of investors and with the governments demand for external funds. Default
immediately occurs if the lenders coordinate their expectations on a high risk equilibrium,
thereby imposing an unsustainable nancing burden on the government through high risk
premia.
Second, when we focus on the low equilibrium interest rate, which exhibits plausible
comparative static properties, default premia can occur for a wide range of productivity
levels and monotonically increase with the initial debt level. We nd substantial risk
4Without such an assumption or Uribes (2006) scal closing rules, default rates (and rational expec-
tations thereof) can only be determined in the initial period, as shown in Schaberts (2009) analysis on
monetary policy and equilibrium determinacy.
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premia (even at low to moderate debt levels) when innovations to the productivity process
are assumed to be uniformly distributed.
Third, we apply a calibrated version of the model with normally distributed innovations
to a serially correlated productivity level. Interestingly, we nd that risk premia may
emerge over time even if the initial stock of public debt does not exceed the present value
of expected future surpluses. However, for the model to be able to explain pervasive
risk premia, the productivity process has to be characterized either by low levels of serial
correlation or by high innovation variances, such that an extremely unfavorable state has
a non-negligible probability. In order to rationalize the empirically observed coexistence
of moderately high debt to gdp ratios and sizeable interest rate spreads interpreted as risk
premia, the implied variance of output would have to be much higher than has been the
case in historical data. For productivity processes that are typically used in business cycle
research, we nd that default risk premia occur only rarely, and only at very high ratios
of debt over output.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and shows how
we derive expected default risk and the ensuing premium on public bonds. Section 3
describes the determination of equilibrium risk premia. Section 4 presents results for two
versions of the model di¤ering in the assumptions about the distribution of productivity
shocks. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
In this section we present a simple real dynamic general equilibrium model where the
government levies income taxes and issues non-state contingent one period debt. We
consider the case where scal policy does not guarantee that the government never runs
a Ponzi-game.5 Households are assumed to stop lending to the government when they
realize that a Ponzi scheme is inevitable. Without further access to credit, the government
defaults while lenders can seize current net revenues. Households know that this event is
possible when adverse productivity shocks lead to a build-up of public debt. They form
expectations of the future fractional rate of repayment of government debt. Accordingly,
equilibrium in the asset market requires that risk premia exist in order to compensate
household-lenders for the risk of government default.
2.1 The private sector
There exists a continuum of innitely lived and identical households of mass one. Their
utility increases in consumption ct and decreases in working time lt, the latter variable
5This assumption is analoguous to the scal policy specication in Uribe (2006) and in the scal theory
of the price level (see Sims, 1994, and Woodford, 1994). In contrast to these studies, in our purely real
model the price level is irrelevant.
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being bounded by a unit time endowment such that lt 2 (0; 1). The objective of a repre-
sentative household is given by
maxEs
1X
t=0
t

ln ct+s +
1  lt+s


; with  2 (0; 1);  > 0, (1)
where  denotes the discount factor. Households borrow and lend among each other via
one-period private debt contracts. Private debt is introduced here to dene a risk free
interest rate Rrft . Let dt 1 denote the beginning of period net private asset position and
1=Rrft the period-t-price for a payo¤ of one unit of output in period t+1. We restrict our
attention to the case where private debt contracts are enforceable and households satisfy
the borrowing constraint
lim
t!1

dt+s=R
rf
t+s
 tY
i=1
1=Rrfs+i 1  0: (2)
Utility maximization subject to the borrowing constraint (2) requires the following rst
order condition for borrowing and lending in terms of private debt (i.e. the consumption
Euler equation) to be satised
c 1t = R
rf
t Et
 
c 1t+1

; (3)
as well as the transversality condition
lim
t!1Es

dt+s=R
rf
t+s
 tY
i=1
1=Rrfs+i 1 = 0. (4)
Households can further invest in one-period government bonds bt, subject to b 1 > 0 and
bt  0. The government o¤ers one-period debt contracts at the price 1=Rt in period t that
promise to deliver one unit of output in period t+1. In contrast to private borrowers, the
government does not guarantee full debt repayment. In case of default the lenders will
proportionally be served with current net revenues. It should be noted that this di¤ers
from the case of lending to a rm, where default typically leads to lenderstaking over the
rm as a claimant on future prot streams through a debt-to-equity swap. In the present
context, however, households cannot become shareholders of the government, such that
lenders cannot seize more than current net revenues.
If current and discounted future surpluses are expected to be large enough to repay
outstanding debt, the household optimality condition for investment in government bonds
would be the analogue to the Euler equation (3), namely, c 1t = RtEt
 
c 1t+1

. The
requirement bt  0 further requires that in the household optimum the transversality
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condition
lim
t!1Es (bt+s=Rt+s)
tY
i=1
1=Rrfs+i 1 = 0 (5)
holds, where Rt+s = R
rf
t+s when the government fully services its debt obligations. If
beginning-of-period public debt exceeds a level that is too high to be repayable even for
the maximum present value of budget surpluses (see section 2.2 for a precise denition
of these), the government runs into a Ponzi game, which would be inconsistent with the
households transversality condition (5). In this case, households are assumed to stop
lending to the government, which necessarily implies that the government defaults in
period t, i.e. can honor only a fraction of its debt obligations out of current surpluses.
Since households are assumed to have rational expectations, they realize the possibility
of partial default on government bonds and account for the probability of default (of course,
since households are atomistic, an individual investor does not take into consideration the
inuence of his behavior on the probability of default). Let 1   t denote the fraction of
government bonds that is redeemed and t 2 [0; 1] the default rate. The household ow
budget constraint then reads
ct + (bt=Rt) +

dt=R
rf
t

 (1   t)wtlt + (1  t) bt 1 + dt 1 + t;
where t are rmsprots, and labor income wtlt (with the real wage rate wt) is subject
to a proportional tax rate  t 2 (0; 1). The household optimum is characterized by the rst
order conditions (3),
ct=  (1   t)wt; (6)
c 1t =RtEt
 
c 1t+1 (1  t+1)

; (7)
and the transversality conditions (4) and (5). Note that the Euler equation for risky
government debt, (7), di¤ers from the one for risk-free private debt (3), in that the pricing
of government bonds is a¤ected by the fact that repayment is expected to be only partial
because of possible future default.
If debt bt+s 1 at the beginning of some period t+s is too large such that a Ponzi game
becomes inevitable, households do not lend to the government, i.e. the end of period debt
equals zero, bt+s = 0, and the government defaults. Lending may resume, however, in the
subsequent periods, when partial default has ameliorated the scal position.
Perfectly competitive rms produce the output good yt with a simple linear technology
yt = atlt; (8)
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where labor productivity at is generated by
at = at 1 + (1  )a+ "t; (9)
here a > 0 is a constant long-run average productivity level, the persistence parameter is
 2 (0; 1), and "t is an i.i.d. zero mean random variable. For the analysis of risk premia,
we will consider two di¤erent distributions for the innovations "t below in sections 4.1 and
4.2. Labor demand satises
wt = at: (10)
2.2 The public sector
The government does not have access to lump-sum taxation. It raises revenues by issuing
debt and taxing labor income, and purchases an exogenously given amount gt of the
nal good in each period. Throughout, we assume government spending to be constant,
gt = g > 0. The underlying assumption is that political constraints make a certain amount
of government spending inevitable. The ow budget constraint is given by
btR
 1
t + st = (1  t) bt 1; (11)
where the surpluses st equal tax revenues net of expenditures,
st =  twtlt   g: (12)
The government does not guarantee to fully service debt. We assume that the government
does not preclude that public debt might evolve on a path that implies a Ponzi scheme.
Since households are not willing to engage in such schemes, they may stop lending and
(temporarily) disrupt the government from access to credit.
To see this, consider, for a moment, the default free case, i.e. presume the non-
repayment rate t+k were equal to zero for all k  0. In this case, one would obtain
by iterating the government ow budget constraint (11) forward and taking expectations,
t+k = 0 8k  0)
bt 1 = Et
1X
k=0
st+k
kY
i=1
(1=Rt+i 1) + lim
k!1
Etbt+kR
 1
t+k
kY
i=1
1
Rt+i 1
: (13)
Now suppose that outstanding debt bt 1 exceeds the present value of future surpluses, i.e.
the rst term on the right hand side of (13). Then, the limit term would exceed zero,
limk!1Etbt+kR 1t+k
Qk
i=1 1=Rt+i 1 > 0. By denition, the government would then run
into a Ponzi game. But this, together with Rt+k = R
rf
t+k 8k  0 for t = 0 (see 3 and
7) would be inconsistent with the householdstransversality condition (5). As mentioned
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above, we assume that households will then stop lending to the government, such that
bt = 0 in that period. The only way for the government budget constraint (11) to be
satised in this case is through default in the sense t > 0.
As a specic way to implement a scal policy that entails default risk in this sense,
we assume that the government keeps the tax rate constant,  t =  . This is a prominent
example of a large class of scal rules that do not incorporate enough self-corrective
behavior on the part of the government as to avoid Ponzi schemes in each period of time.6
However, it can also be viewed as a natural benchmark in this framework: if government
bonds were state contingent, it is well-established that in this type of model an optimal
income tax rate under commitment (and without default) would have to be constant
and su¢ ciently large to nance initial outstanding debt and future expenditures (see e.g.
Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004). In this paper, government bonds are however non-state
contingent, which implies that this type of tax policy is in general not consistent with a
set of measurability constraints for each period that relate the present value of future
surpluses to the beginning of period stock of public debt to rule out Ponzi games (see
Ayiagari et al., 2002). The choice of a constant tax rate can thus, besides being a simple
example, be seen as the behavior of a government that ignores this subtle di¤erence and
sets the tax rate as if debt were state contingent.
Note that there exists a maximum value for the present value of future surpluses, which
we call the maximum debt repayment capacity. The latter is the maximum amount of debt
that the government would be able to repay if it imposes the revenue maximizing tax rate
for the entire future. A well dened revenue maximizing tax rate, , exists because with
proportional labor income taxation there is a tax La¤er curve with an interior maximum
(see section 2.3 for an explicit derivation). We denote the period t value of the maximum
debt repayment capacity by 	t, dened as
	t = Et
1X
k=0
st+k
kY
i=1
1=Rrft+i 1: (14)
Here, st+k = 
wt+kl

t+k g is the maximum period surplus that is obtained if the revenue
maximizing tax rate  is applied. This leads to corresponding levels of labor income
denoted wt+kl

t+k and the risk free rate R
rf
t+k is applied for discounting.
7 Note that house-
6This assumption rules out the debt stabilizing behavior that has been found by Bohn (1998) to char-
acterize US scal policy empirically.
7Note that the maximum debt repayment capacity bears a resemblance to Aiyagaris (1994) natural
debt limit for consumers. Private households cannot accumulate more debt than would be expected to
be repaid by pledging the entire stream of future incomes. While households are assumed to respect the
natural private debt limit (as a borrowing constraint), the government is not constrained in an analogous
way, which is why default may occasionally occur in our model.
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holds will account for the maximum debt repayment capacity for their lending decision in
equilibrium. We thereby allow for the case where the current tax rate di¤ers from revenue
maximizing tax rate, which could in principle be implemented by future governments.
The maximum initial debt level that can be expected to be repaid without default
is thus characterized by bt 1 = 	t. The government will fully serve debt obligations if
bt 1  	t. As long as this is the case, no government default occurs. Default, however,
becomes inevitable if the current stock of debt exceeds the maximum repayment capacity:
bt 1 > 	t: (15)
If this is the case, no constant tax rate is able to generate enough current and future
revenues to enable full repayment of outstanding debt.
In the case where (15) is satised, (13) with Rt+k = R
rf
t+k 8k  0 is inconsistent
with the transversality condition (5) and no individual household is willing to lend to
the government. The consequence is that aggregate lending to the government comes
to a halt, such that end-of-period debt equals zero, bt = 0, in the current period. The
government is then unable to fully honor its obligations and redeems as much as possible
of its outstanding debt out of current surpluses. As a consequence, repayment will only
be partial. The non-repayment rate t in the case (15) satises t = 1  st=bt 1 (see 11).
To sum up, if beginning-of-period debt bt 1 is smaller than 	t, households are willing
to lend to the government according to (7), while the government does not default in
period t, t = 0, and borrows to balance its budget such that end-of-period debt equals
bt = (bt 1   st)Rt. The price of debt, 1=Rt, then reects the probability of default in t+1.
If, however, beginning-of-period debt is too high such that (15) is satised, households stop
lending. The government then has to default and repays debt as far as possible, with a
default rate equal to t = 1   st=bt 1. In the period subsequent to a default event, the
stock of government debt is zero and default is not possible in the next period, such that
households are again willing to lend to the government (of course taking the endogenous
probability of further future defaults into account).
3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, prices adjust to clear markets for goods, labor, and assets and the net
stock of risk-free private debt dt is zero in the aggregate. Householdsinitial asset endow-
ments are assumed to be positive, i.e. the government is initially indebted. A rational
expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences fct; lt 2 [0; 1]; yt; wt, bt  0, t 2 [0; 1]; Rrft ,
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Rt; stg1t=0 satisfying (3), (6), (7), (8), (10), (12) and
yt= ct + gt; (16)
bt=
(
(bt 1   st)Rt if 	t  bt 1
0 if 	t < bt 1
; (17)
t=
(
0 if 	t  bt 1
1  st=bt 1 if 	t < bt 1
, (18)
(4), (5), and (14), a scal policy setting  2 [0; 1], given fatg1t=0, g > 0, and initial debt
b 1 > 0.
The equilibrium allocation is not directly a¤ected by public debt and the (expected)
default rate. The rst property is due to the fact that the labor income tax is assumed
not to be contingent on the scal stance. The second property follows from the fact that
default does not lead to any kind of resource losses or distortions. Of course, the price
of government bonds will depend on the expected default rate, which can be seen from
the asset pricing equation (7). This reection of the probability of future default in the
interest rate on government bonds is our main object of study.
The equilibrium sequences of consumption, working time, output, the wage rate, the
risk free rate and government surpluses fct; lt; yt; wt, Rrft , stg1t=0 are determined for given
g and fatg1t=0 by (6), (8), (10), (12) and (16), which can be summarized by
ct= c (at; ) :=  (1  ) at (19)
lt= l (at; ) := (c (at; ) + g) =at (20)
st= s (at; ) := c (at; )  (1  )g (21)
Rrft = c (at; )
 1  1=Et

c (at+1; )
 1

(22)
as well as wt = at and yt = atl (at; ).8
While the equilibrium sequences fct; lt; yt; wt, stg1t=0 are not a¤ected by sovereign
default, these variables are of course correlated with the default rate t due to changes in
the state at. In any case, they will be stationary, given that the state at is stationary.
With the above solutions, we can easily identify a time-invariant tax rate to compute
the maximum debt repayment capacity (14). We look for a feasible tax rate  2 (0; 1)
that maximizes tax revenues for the case where the state equals its mean (at = a), wl =
 [ (1  ) a + g]. This tax rate satises F () := g + a (1  2) = 0, such that the
8 If default occurs (t = 1   st=bt 1) the budget constraints imply ct = (1    t)wtlt + (1  t) bt 1 =
(1   t)wtlt + st and thus yt = atlt = ct + g.
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unique tax rate  that maximizes tax revenues is given by
 =
1
2
+
g
2a
:
In order to determine the default rate and its expected value, we need to check in every
period if the level of debt exceeds the maximum debt repayment capacity and to com-
pute expectations about future defaults. As can be seen from (34), the maximum debt
repayment capacity is solely a function of (policy and preference) parameters and of the
current and future exogenous states of the economy. Given that it contains expectations
of a non-linear function of future states, we apply a second order approximation of 	t.
Though public debt might not be stationary, we can exploit the fact that the exogenous
state variable at is stationary and apply a local approximation of 	t at the unconditional
mean a. In appendix 7.1, we show that 	t can be approximated by:
	(at; "; ; 
) '  (1  ) at 

f(a)
1   +
f 0 (a)
1  (at   a) (23)
+
1
2f
00 (a)
1  2
 
2"
1    
2"
1  2

+
 
1  2 (at   a)2
1  2
!)
:
According to (23), 	t is a function only of todays state and time invariant parameter
values. Due to this property we can easily compute equilibrium values for the expected
default rate, public debt, and the bond price in a recursive way.
The expected default rate, public debt, and the bond price have to be determined
simultaneously using the equilibrium conditions (7), (17), and (18). In order to identify
these solutions, we have to consider the probabilities of the two distinct cases 	t  bt 1
and 	t < bt 1.
Let at be the productivity level that leads to a maximum debt repayment capacity 	t
that exactly equals bt 1,
at : 	 (a

t ; "; ; 
) = bt 1: (24)
Thus, at is the minimum productivity level that allows full debt repayment and thus pre-
cludes default; we will refer to this as the productivity threshold. Further, let t (at+1) =
 (at+1jat) be the probability of a particular value at+1 conditional on at. Then, the
probabilities of default and of non-default in t+ 1 conditional on the information in t are
prob (	t+1 < btjat; bt) =
Z at+1
 1
t (at+1) dat+1;
prob (	t+1  btjat; bt) =
Z 1
at+1
t (at+1) dat+1:
We now rewrite the asset pricing equation (7), which includes the expectation term
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Et

c 1t+1 (1  t+1)

. We thereby have to account for the possibility that consumption
and the default rate are not independent. According to the assumptions in section 2.2,
the default rate t+1 equals zero if 	t+1  bt, and t+1 = 1  st+1=bt if 	t+1 < bt. Hence,
Et

c 1t+1 (1  t+1)

is given by
Et

c 1t+1 (1  t+1)

=
Z at+1
 1
t (at+1)

c 1t+1  (st+1=bt)

dat+1 +
Z 1
at+1
t (at+1)

c 1t+1  (1  0)

dat+1
= b 1t
Z at+1
 1
t (at+1)
h
c (at+1; )
 1 s (at+1; )
i
dat+1 +
Z 1
at+1
t (at+1)
h
c (at+1; )
 1
i
dat+1;
where we used the solutions (19) and (21). The asset pricing equation (7) can thus be
written as
1=Rt = 
Et

c 1t+1 (1  t+1)

c 1t
) 1=Rt = (25)

c 1t
"
b 1t
Z at+1
 1
t (at+1)
h
c (at+1; )
 1 s (at+1; )
i
dat+1 +
Z 1
at+1
t (at+1)
h
c (at+1; )
 1
i
dat+1
#
;
while the expected repayment rate, which is restricted to lie between zero and one, is
Et (1  t+1) = b 1t
Z at+1
 1
t (at+1) s (at+1; ) dat+1 +
Z 1
at+1
t (at+1) dat+1 2 (0; 1): (26)
Risk premia can be computed as follows (further details on the numerical algorithm that
we use to solve the model can be found in appendix 7.2):
1. At the beginning of period t, bt 1 is known and the shock to at realizes. We get so-
lutions fct,stg from (19) and (21). Then, we compute the maximum debt repayment
capacity using (23) to check whether it is exceeded by bt 1 or not.
2. If 	t < bt 1, the government defaults at the rate t = 1 st=bt 1, while end-of-period
debt equals zero, bt = 0. Since default cannot occur in t + 1, Et (1  t+1) = 1,
the bond price equals the risk-free price 1=Rrft = Et
 
c 1t+1=c
 1
t

in this particular
period, and at+1 = 0.
3. If 	t  bt 1, the government does not default in period t. The bond price 1=Rt, end-
of-period debt bt, and the productivity threshold at+1 then simultaneously solve (25),
the updated version of (24) which reads bt = 	
 
at+1; "; ; 

, and the governments
ow budget identity
bt=Rt = bt 1   st; (27)
which gives the governments demand for funds, while the expected repayment rate
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is determined by (26).
4. After the equilibrium bond price 1=Rt is derived, we compute the sovereign risk
premium using
Rt  Rrft =
c 1t
Et

c 1t+1 (1  t+1)
   c 1t
Etc
 1
t+1
which is non-zero only if 	t  bt 1.
4 Results
In this section we examine how government bonds are priced when investors account for the
possibility of sovereign default. The rst subsection presents the main novel contribution of
the paper: the determination of risk premia in a dynamic general equilibrium model where
sovereign default is based on the governments unwillingness to guarantee not to run Ponzi
games. We consider uniformly distributed productivity shocks in the rst subsection, to
gain as much analytical insight as possible. In the second subsection, we consider the case
of normally distributed productivity shocks and provide a quantitative assessment of risk
premia.
4.1 A version with uniformly distributed innovations
To demonstrate how asset prices and public debt are determined in this model, we rst
apply a simplied version of the model. To lighten the notation in this section, we drop
the time index and dene a = at, a0 = at+1, a = at+1 for all a 2 (al; ah), where al
and ah are positive constants. We assume that the innovations " are uniformly distributed
between al a and ah a, and that the productivity level is not serially correlated ( = 0).
Further, to be able to present closed form expressions, we assume that only the rst-order
terms of the maximum debt capacity (23) are non-negligible.
With these assumptions, consumption, surpluses, and maximum repayable debt are
linear functions of the current exogenous state:
	(a) = (1  )     a 1g (1  ) 1 a = 1a; (28)
c (a) =  (1  ) a = 2a; (29)
s (a) =  (1  ) a  (1  )g = 3a  4; (30)
where in each line the second equality sign denes the composite parameters 1;2;3;4 > 0.
Further, end of period debt satises b = 	(a) = 1a (see 24), and the government
budget (27) demands 1=R = (b 1   s) =b = (b 1   3a+ 4) =1a. The asset pricing
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equation (25) can then be written as
1=R = a
(
(1a
) 1
"
3
Z a
 1

 
a0

da0   4
Z a
 1

 
a0
  
1=a0

da0
#
+
Z 1
a

 
a0
  
1=a0

da0
)
;
and the expected repayment rate as E
 
1  0 = (1a) 1[3 R a 1  (a0) a0da0 4 R a 1  (a0) da0]+R1
a  (a
0) da0. Using the assumption of a uniform distribution of a to solve for the integrals,
we get the asset pricing equation
1=R = 
a
ah   al

3 (a
   al)  4 (log a   log al)
1a
+ (log ah   log a)

: (31)
Dening the RHS of (31) as G(a) =  aah al f
3(a al) 4(log a log al)
1a + (log ah   log a)g
and taking derivatives with respect to a delivers G0(a) =  aah al (a
) 2 [ 11 (3al   4 +
4 ln a
=al)  a] and G00(a) = a(ah al) (a)
 3 [ 11 (34  24 ln a  23al+24 ln al)+ a].
The signs of these expressions are di¢ cult to determine in general, but are clear for the
relevant case of high values of the discount factor . To see this, note that in the limiting
case  ! 1)  11 ! 0 we have G0(a) > 0 and G00(a) < 0, hence in this case (31) implies
the interest rate R = 1=G(a) to be an increasing and convex function of the threshold
a and, by b = 	(a) = 1a, of the end of period debt level b. The intuitive reason for
this positive relation is that future surpluses that su¢ ce to repay debt become less likely
for higher thresholds a, which tends to reduce the expected return from bonds (since it
increases the probability of default). Thus, investors demand a higher interest rate for
compensation.
At the same time, the period budget constraint (27) determines the governments
demand for funds. Given the assumptions made in this subsection, it reads
1=R = (b 1   s) =b = (b 1   3a+ 4) =1a: (32)
Given the predetermined stock of debt at the beginning of the period b 1 and the observed
current state a, the budget constraint implies that the amount of debt is proportional to
the interest rate R. Since repayment of a higher end-of-period stock of bonds requires a
higher threshold a (see 24), the budget constraint (32) also leads to a positive relation
between the interest rate R and the threshold a :
R = 	(a) = (b 1   s(a)) : (33)
The proportionality between R and b = 	(a) = 1a reects the fact that for a given
initial debt level and a given surplus the government has to issue more debt if the interest
rate is higher.
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Figure 1: Multiple equilibrium bond prices
For illustration, we use the scal policy parameters  = 0:38 and g=y = 0:35 (see section
4.2 for a more detailed discussion), and standard values for the preference parameters,
 = 0:99 and  chosen so that steady state labor supply is l = 1=3 (the corresponding
value for  is 0:35). We further assume that the uniform distribution is characterized by
ah = 1:99; al = 0:01. We choose initial debt levels to match a debt to gdp ratio (at the
mean of the productivity level) equal to 1, 2 and 3, respectively. For these parameter
values we plot the interest rate R as a function of the end-of-period debt level b (which
equals 1a) in gure 1, using the pricing equation (31) (the solid line) and the budget
constraint R = (b 1   s) 1 b (the dashed lines correspond to the three initial debt levels
considered).
In gure 1, the budget equation (33), which gives the governments demand for funds, is
sloping upward linearly. At the same time, the asset pricing equation (31), which gives the
householdssupply of funds, is also upward sloping, but with an increasing slope.9 With
higher end of period debt levels the interest rate level increases more than proportionally.
In the limiting case where default occurs with a probability of almost one, the interest
9 It should be noted that the increasing slope of the RHS of the asset pricing equation (31) does not rely
on the non-linear householdsstochastic discount factor (and thus on risk aversion). This can be seen from
the expected repayment rate, which in case of risk neutral households would equal 1= times the bond
price (1=R = E (1  0)): E (1  0) = (ah   al) 1f[3 12
 
a2   a2l
  4 (a   al)] (1a) 1 + (ah   a)g.
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Figure 2: Interest rate spreads for uniformly distributed productivity innovations
rate tends to innity. Hence, equilibrium credit demand (33) and credit supply (31) imply
that there is either no equilibrium or there exist two equilibrium values for the interest
rate R.
As gure 1 also shows, the lower equilibrium interest rate increases with a higher
stock of initially outstanding debt b 1. In contrast, the high equilibrium interest rate
decreases with higher initial debt. Given this implausible comparative static property of
the high equilibrium rate, we will focus on the lower equilibrium interest rate throughout
the following analysis.10 Thus, assuming that capital market participants coordinate their
expectations on low equilibrium interest rates, we examine how the sovereign risk premium
behaves in response to a change in the state of the economy. Figure 2 shows the models
implied equilibrium pricing rule, giving the interest rate spread on risky government bonds
as a function of the beginning of period ratio of debt to output. The gure shows that the
risk premium increases monotonically in the debt to output ratio, and that it is uniformly
higher in a situation where the current state of the business cycle is below average (see
the dashed and dotted lines in the gure which depict two cases where a < 1).
Thus, in a qualitative sense, the model succeeds in generating risk premia that respond
10 In simulations, we found that the realization of the high equilibrium interest rate would immediately
force default.
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in an intuitive way to higher levels of indebtedness and to the state of the business cycle,
which both determine the risk that the government experiences di¢ culties to repay. Of
course, the risk premia depicted in gure 2 are quantitatively extremely large by empirical
standards. This is due to the simplifying assumption made here that the productivity
distribution is uniform and there is no persistence of shocks. This implies that all states
are equally likely to realize, including those which are scally extremely unfavorable.
To conclude, we have shown in this section that risk premia are pervasive and large
even in comparatively good times  if extreme states of the world have a non-negligible
probability (as is obviously the case under uniformly distributed shocks). Though stylized,
the result shows that under this assumption it is possible, in principle, to theoretically
explain interest rate spreads on government bonds through default risk. However, it
is clear that the assumption of a uniform distribution is extreme and not likely to be
empirically realistic. Therefore, in the next section we will conduct a numerical analysis
where the productivity process is more in line with standard assumptions in the business
cycle literature.
4.2 A version with normally distributed innovations
In this section, we relax the simplications made above and solve the model numerically for
more realistic assumptions about the productivity process. In particular, we assume that
the productivity process in (9) can be serially correlated,  > 0, and that innovations "t are
normally distributed. The parameters are chosen as follows. We interpret one period as a
year. The discount rate is therefore set at  = 0:97 to match a standard average value for a
risk free annual real interest rate. The tax rate used is  = 0:38 as a representative value for
European countries (see references in Trabandt and Uhlig, 2009, who discuss appropriate
calibration of average marginal tax rates for European countries in detail). The constant
level of government spending g was scaled to lead to a debt level corresponding to 100% of
yearly gdp. As noted in the introduction, this scenario of government debt levels worth one
years output appears to be representative of the situation that many countries will nd
themselves in quite soon, given the currently observed decits (see IMF, 2009). We hence
choose a government spending level that leads to an average share in output of g=y = 0:35,
in which case the chosen initial debt to output ratio would be constant in an environment
without shocks. Thus, we demonstrate that in a stochastic world default risk premia will
emerge even if the initial level of debt is sustainable in the sense just described. Further,
we set the mean working time share equal to l = 1=3 (and adjust  accordingly).
For the quantitative results, the volatility of the innovations "t is of utmost impor-
tance. To calibrate it, we regress the log of annual real gdp for the 16 member countries
18
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Figure 3:  = 0:9 and st:dev:(byt) = 0:075
of the European Monetary Union on a constant and a linear time trend.11 The estimated
standard deviations of real output range from 3:9 percent for the Netherlands to 15:7
percent for Greece, with a mean of 7:3 per cent. For the benchmark case, we choose
the innovation variance in our model such that for a given autocorrelation of  = 0:9, as
customarily used in the business cycle literature, the standard deviation of byt = log yt=y
from stochastically simulated model runs conforms with this average value. We further
consider alternative cases where the autocorrelation coe¢ cient is lowered and the innova-
tion variance is increased. This allows us to see how risk premia would react under more
severe macroeconomic uctuations.
Figure 3 shows the models pricing rule for risky government bonds for the benchmark
parameterization, again as a relation between the default risk spread and the beginning
of period ratio of debt to output.The gure shows that with normally distributed and
autocorrelated productivity levels, sizeable risk spreads would only occur for extremely
high debt ratios exceeding 250% of gdp. The solid line displays spreads for the steady
state productivity level (a = 1). Adverse business cycle conditions lead to higher premia
11Data are from the European Commissions AMECO database; the time span covered is 1960-2008 for
11 out of the 16 countries, but shorter for Malta, Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia, and unied Germany, due to
data availability.
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Figure 4:  = 0:01 and st:dev:(byt) = 0:075
and occur at somewhat lower debt ratios, as can be seen from the dotted line in the gure
which represents a situation where productivity is ten percent below its steady state value.
Nonetheless, for the range of debt to gdp ratios that are currently observed, i.e. below or
around 100 %, the model cannot explain the emergence of risk premia. This is due to the
fact that, given the assumptions concerning the governments maximum debt repayment
capacity and the size of the underlying variations in the tax base through productivity
shocks, default is an unlikely event. This is rationally anticipated by households who are
thus willing to lend to the government at or very close to the risk free interest rate, unless
the debt to gdp ratio becomes very high.
Consequently, the question arises under which circumstances the model generates de-
fault risk premia for debt to output ratios that are empirically observed, like for Belgium
and Greece where spreads of 23.7 and 113.9 basis points can be observed for debt to gdp
ratios of 88.7 and 96.5 percent, respectively. Figure 4 displays the case of non-persistent
shocks ( = 0:01), where the innovation variance is scaled so that the resulting output
variance is the same as before. As a consequence, for each value of a considered in the
gures the probability of reaching a scally di¢ cult situation through next periods shock
realization is higher than before.As gure 4 shows, the pricing rule shifts in leftward di-
rection with non-persistent shocks, as expected, since default has become more likely in
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Figure 5:  = 0:9 and st:dev:(byt) = 4  0:075
intermediate states. However, the implied risk premia still di¤er from zero only if the
government is extremely indebted.
If we calibrate the model to imply a higher variance of output than in our baseline
specication, it predicts double-digit basis point risk premia at debt ratios below 100%.
This is illustrated in gure 5, where we set  = 0:9 again and choose the innovation
variance in the productivity process so that the implied output variance is four times as
high as the average one historically observed for European countries (and thus roughly
twice as high as the maximum of the observed output variance for these countries). Under
this calibration, the model predicts a relation between spreads and debt to gdp ratios that
is comparable to empirical observations mentioned in the introduction.
As revealed by gure 5, interest rate spreads at moderate debt levels can be rational-
ized within the model if the variance of productivity shocks is very high (analogously to
the case of uniformly distributed shocks in section 4.1 where the implied output variance
was also much higher than in the benchmark scenario). The variance of aggregate shocks
thus appears as the quantitatively most important factor in explaining default risk pre-
mia. The reason is that only in the case of extremely adverse shocks the probability of
the government exceeding its repayment capacity is large enough to warrant sizable risk
premia.
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Figure 6: Examples of stochastic simulation runs
Finally, to give a sense of the time series behavior of the simulated models variables,
we stochastically simulated the technology process with  = 0:9 and the volatility of
the productivity level set to the baseline case underlying gure 3. Each simulated series
exhibits a length of 100 periods. In each of these computational experiments, we recorded
output, risk premia, and the debt to output ratio. The simulation runs were stopped when
default occurred.
Figure 6 shows three example cases of simulation runs. The upper panel displays
simulated output, the middle panel the ratio of debt to gdp, and the lower panel the
realized premium in basis points. The examples displayed in gure 6 are chosen because
the message they convey is typical for the numerical outcomes. First, the occurrence
of premia is obviously rare with the chosen parameterization. Second, premia need not
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necessarily signal impending default, although large premia most of the time do. Third,
the example simulations shown in the gure also show that neither high debt levels, nor
bad business cycle shocks in themselves necessarily generate risk premia. Rather, it is the
combination of these two events that is decisive for the emergence of risk premia.
5 Conclusion
This paper was motivated by the question: can empirically observed spreads between
interest rates on government bonds of di¤erent sovereign issuers in developed countries be
theoretically explained as reecting di¤erential default risk? To study this question, we
have proposed a model where default risk is examined in a macroeconomic model with
a non-optimizing government issuing one period real bonds. Since the model is rather
stylized, the results of this analysis need to be interpreted with some caution, but are
nevertheless suggestive.
First, we have derived default risk premia based upon investorsrational expectations
of the government being unable to fully serve its debt obligations. A government can enter
situations where it cannot avoid running a Ponzi game even if its surpluses were initially
su¢ cient to fully serve debt obligations. Second, this possibility can give rise to multiple
equilibrium interest rates on government bonds that contain default risk premia. Third,
under uniformly distributed productivity shocks these premia can be large and can exist
over the entire support of states. While this specication is rather extreme, it does point
out that non-negligible probabilities of extreme states are a candidate way to explain risk
premia, and thus sovereign bond spreads. Fourth, if the productivity level is realistically
assumed to be normally distributed and serially correlated, risk premia only occur rarely
and at hitherto unobserved levels of government debt, and only in the most cyclically
vulnerable economies.
Thus, our results can be interpreted in two ways. One interpretation is that asset
pricing within a simple macroeconomic framework with aggregate productivity shocks as
the only source of uncertainty is unable to explain sovereign default risk premia. Another
interpretation is that this class of models and the assumed stochastic processes understate
the likelihood of extreme events. This would amount to stating that historical postwar
European data do not reect the true volatility of the underlying shock process, which
is nonetheless present in the expectations of asset market participants (an interpretation
that might gain some credibility given the depth of the current downturn). We leave the
task of assessing the relative merits of each of these interpretations for future research.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Local approximation of the maximum debt capacity
In this appendix, we apply a second order approximation of the maximum debt capacity
(14). For this, we transform 	t in the following way. The surpluses in (14) refer to the no-
default case t+k = 0 8k  t, where the Euler equation reads 1=Rrft+k = Et
 
c 1t+k+1=c
 1
t+k

.
Further, using the law of iterated expectations ki=1(1=R
rf
t+i 1) = (1=R
rf
t )(1=R
rf
t+1)::: =
Et
 
c 1t+1=c
 1
t

Et+1
 
c 1t+2=c
 1
t+1

::: = kEt
 
c 1t+k=c
 1
t

, we can write
	t = Et
1X
k=0
k
c 1t+k
c 1t
st+k;
where ct = c (at; ) denotes consumption as a function of the state and the revenue
maximizing tax rate . Using the solutions for consumption and government surpluses
(19) and (21), we have
	t = c (at; 
)Et
1X
k=0
kc (at+k; 
) 1 s (at+k; ) ;
and summarizing terms we get
	t=	(at; "; ; 
) =  (1  ) atEt
1X
k=0
kf(at+k); (34)
where f(at+k) = 
   a 1t+k 1g:
Using that the exogenous state variable at is generated by a stationary process, we apply
a second order Taylor expansion of Etf(at+k) at a, which yields
Etf(at+k) ' f(a) + f 0 (a)Et (at+k   a) + 1
2
f 00 (a)Et (at+k   a)2 ; (35)
where Etf(at+k) = Et
 
   a 1t+k 1g

and
f(a) =    a 1 1g; f 0(a) = a 2 1g, f 00(a) =  2a 3 1g.
Next, we use that at+k can be written as
at+k = at+k 1 + (1  )a+ "t+k = kat +
k 1X
i=0
i(1  )a+
k 1X
i=0
i"t+k i
= kat + a

1  k

+
k 1X
i=0
i"t+k i: (36)
26
Hence, the mean and the variance of at+k conditional on information in period t, Etat+k
and vartat+k = Et[(at+k)
2]  [Etat+k]2 are given by
Etat+k = 
kat + a

1  k

(37)
vartat+k =Eta
2
t+k  
h
kat + a

1  k
i2
: (38)
The term in (38) can, by substituting out at+k with (36), be simplied to
vartat+k =Et
24 kat + a1  k+ k 1X
i=0
i"t+k i
!235  hkat + a1  ki2
=
h
kat + a

1  k
i2
+ Et
 
k 1X
i=0
i"t+k i
!2
 
h
kat + a

1  k
i2
=Et
 
k 1X
i=0
i"t+k i
!2
=
1  2k
1  2 
2
":
Using (37), we rewrite (35) as
Etf(at+k) ' f(a)+f 0 (a)Et

kat + a

1  k

  a

+
1
2
f 00 (a)
 
Eta
2
t+k   2aEtat+k + a2

:
Further, using Eta2t+k = vartat+k+

kat + a
 
1  k2 = 1 2k
1 2 
2
" +

kat + a
 
1  k2,
we can simplify Etf(at+k) to
Etf(at+k)' f(a) + f 0 (a)Et

kat + a

1  k

  a

+
1
2
f 00 (a)

1  2k
1  2 
2
" +
h
kat + a

1  k
i2   2a hkat + a1  ki+ a2
= f(a) + f 0 (a) k(at   a) + 1
2
f 00 (a)

1  2k
1  2 
2
" + 
2k (at   a)2

: (39)
Summing up the discounted values of Etf(at+k) for k = 0 to 1, and using (39), we get
1X
k=0
kEtf(at+k)'
1X
k=0
kf(a) +
1X
k=0
kf 0 (a) k(at   a)
+
1X
k=0
k
1
2
f 00 (a)
1  2k
1  2 
2
" +
1X
k=0
k
1
2
f 00 (a) 2k (at   a)2
=
1
1   f(a) + f
0 (a) (at   a)
1X
k=0
kk
+
1
2f
00 (a)2"
1  2
 1X
k=0
k  
1X
k=0
k2k
!
+
1
2
f 00 (a) (at   a)2
1X
k=0
k2k
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Since  and  lie inside the unit circle, the innite sums converge to nite values:
1X
k=0
kEtf(at+k)' 1
1   f(a) +
f 0 (a)
1  (at   a)
+
1
2f
00 (a)
1  2

2"

1
1    
1
1  2

+
1  2
1  2 (at   a)
2

:
Hence, the maximum debt capacity 	 can be approximated as
	(at; "; ; g; 
)
'  (1  ) at 

1
1   f(a) +
f 0 (a)
1  (at   a)
+
1
2f
00 (a)
1  2

2"

1
1    
1
1  2

+
1  2
1  2 (at   a)
2
)
:
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7.2 Computation
We replace the original problem presented in sections 2 and 3 by a discrete valued problem,
i.e. we assume that the models state space consists of a nite number of discrete points.
First, we describe the setup of the computation. Thereafter, we explain how we simulate
the model numerically. The numerical procedure is further used for the pricing rules in
section 4.1 and section 4.2.
A. Setup of the computation
A1. Choose the following parameters of the model:
Parameter Description Benchmark Calibration
Preferences
l Labor in steady state 1/3
 Discount factor 0.99
 Preference parameter

1  gy

l

= (1  )
Productivity process
and state space
 Autocorrelation 0.9
" Std. of productivity shocks 0.0503
a Unconditional mean of TFP 1
n Number of TFP states 1001
Government
g=y Government share 0.35
 Tax rate 0.38
 La¤er curve maximizer 0.67
A2. Use Tauchens (1982) algorithm to approximate the continuous valued AR(1)-process
for productivity (see 7) by a discrete valued Markov chain. Provide the size of the
interval Ia = [a1; an] and the number of grid points, n: Tauchens algorithm then
delivers the exogenous state space of the model12
S = fa1; a2; :::; ang ; ai < ai+1; i = 1; 2; :::; n  1;
12We use equally spaced points  = ai+1   ai for all i = 1; 2; :::; n  1:
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and the associated transition probability matrix P = (pij) ; whose row i and column
j element is the probability of moving from state ai state to state aj : Given ; the
interval Ia is chosen to include 4 standard deviations of the productivity process.13
A3. Given the grid points S; use (19) ; (20) ; and (21) to compute the policy functions for
consumption, labor, and government surpluses, respectively.
A4. Use (23) to compute the maximum debt repayment capacity 	 for all grid points in
the set S. Thus, for 	 we get a vector of n elements where each element gives 	 if
the state of the system is aj 2 S:
The numerical algorithm to calculate sovereign risk premia is divided into two parts.
The calculations performed in the rst part do neither depend on government default nor
on debt levels. In the second part of the algorithm we proceed recursively to determine
t; bt; a

t+1; and Rt:
B. Computing the debt-independent part of the economy
B1. Use a random number generator and the transition probability matrix P to simulate
a time series t = 1; :::; T of the stochastic state a of length T: Assume that the
economy is initially in steady state, i.e. at=1 = a:
B2. Given the simulated sequence for productivity, use the policy functions for c; l; s; and
y, (19)-(21) and yt = atl (at; ), to determine a time series for consumption, labor,
surpluses, and output.
B3. Calculate the risk free rate, which is given by
Rrft =
c 1t
Etc
 1
t+1
:
In this expression, the conditional expectation Etc 1t+1 is calculated as
Etc
 1
t+1 =
nX
j=1
pij  c (aj ; ; ) 1 ;
where i denotes the index number for todays stochastic state, at:
13When computing the pricing rule for the specication that implies st:dev: (y^t) = 4  0:075 (see Figure
5), the width of the productivity grid is reduced to include 2 standard deviations to ensure a1 > 0:
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C. Computing the debt-dependent part of the economy
C1. At the beginning of each period the initial debt level, b 1, is given. With a randomly
drawn realization for the exogenous state at, surpluses st = s (at; ; ) and the
maximum debt repayment capacity of the current period, 	t = 	
 
at; 
2
"; ; ; 

are also known (see A).
C2. Check whether the government defaults in period t or not.
(a) If 	t < bt 1, the government defaults and the default rate is calculated as
t = 1  st=bt 1:
The end of period debt level equals zero as well as the default rate in t+ 1
bt = t+1 = 0:
Since the government will not default in t+ 1, the asset price therefore equals
the inverse of the risk-free rate
1
Rt
=
1
Rrft
:
To proceed with the next period, go back to step C2 and set the initial debt
level in period t+ 1 to 0.
(b) If 	t  bt 1, the government does not default on its outstanding debt, t = 0.
Replacing the integrals in (25) by sums over the nite number of states, the
asset pricing equation reads
bt 1   st
bt
=

c 1t
24b 1t Pat+1at+1=a1 t (at+1) hc (at+1) 1 s (at+1)i
+
Pan
at+1=at+1
t (at+1)
h
c (at+1)
 1
i 35 (40)
Use the updated version of (25) to replace bt = 	
 
at+1; "; ; ; 

in (40) :
bt 1   st =
	
 
at+1; "; ; ; 


c 1t
(41)

24	  at+1; "; ; ;  1Pat+1at+1=a1 t (at+1) hc (at+1) 1 s (at+1)i
+
Pan
at+1=at+1
t (at+1)
h
c (at+1)
 1
i 35 :
This equation is solved for the unknown productivity threshold in the next
period, at+1, which is its only unknown. To nd at+1, we calculate the right
hand side of (41) for all grid points S (corresponding to all possible candidate
solutions for at+1). There are three possible cases:
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i. If the initial debt level net of current surpluses is too high for any possible
productivity level at+1 or if the expected repayment rate Et(1   t+1) is
smaller than zero, there is no solution to (41) and default is inevitable. The
default rate equals t = 1  st=bt 1, while 1=Rt = 1=Rrft and bt = 0.
ii. If the initial debt level net of current surpluses is too low for any possible
productivity level at+1 or if the expected repayment rate Et(1   t+1) ex-
ceeds one, default will not be expected to occur for any productivity level
considered. The bond price is then set equal to the inverse of the risk free
rate 1=Rrft and next periods debt level is calculated from the governments
budget identity, bt = (bt 1   st)Rrft .
iii. If there exists a grid point for at+1 2 S, at which the absolute distance
between the left hand side and right hand side of (41) is smallest and
the slope of the right-hand side of (41) is positive (see the discussion on
multiple equilibria in Section 4.1), next-periods debt level bt and the asset
price 1=Rt are determined by
bt = 	
 
at+1; "; ; ; 

and
1
Rt
=

c 1t
24	  at+1; "; ; ;  1Pat+1at+1=a1 t (at+1) hc (at+1) 1 s (at+1)i
+
Pan
at+1=at+1
t (at+1)
h
c (at+1)
 1
i 35 ;
where the latter equation is the right hand side of the asset pricing equation
(41) (evaluated at at+1) divided by bt = 	
 
at+1; "; ; ; 

.
To proceed with the next period t+1, use bt as the initial debt level in the next
period and go back to step C2.
C3. The time series of risk premia on government bonds is calculated from Rt  Rrft :
The pricing rules discussed in Section 4.2 can be computed analogously to the stochastic
simulation described here. To obtain the pricing rules, use a given grid for the initial debt
level, b 1, in step C1 of the procedure and compute the equilibrium interest rate for all
realizations on the productivity grid S:
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